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In a recent post, my good friend and colleague José Luis Martí usefully describes
the decision recently rendered by the Spanish Supreme Court convicting several
Catalan secessionist leaders of a number of crimes in connection with the political
events that developed in Catalonia in September and October 2017. According to
Martí, the Supreme Court’s ruling is not only “unjust and legally wrong”, but is also
unconstitutional, “since it compromises the fundamental democratic rights of protest -
the freedom of expression, the freedom of assembly, and the right to demonstrate”. I
disagree with his conclusion and with some of the points he makes to support it. 
Before I argue my case, let me be clear that I fully share Martí’s opinion, powerfully
articulated in previous posts, that the events we witnessed in September and
October 2017 in Catalonia amounted to a “coup d’etat from the standing point of
Spanish constitutional legality”. That’s exactly how we should characterize the grave
attempt at subverting the constitutional order that took place at that time. 
To make the story short, readers should recall that in September 2017 the Catalan
parliament passed two crucial statutes that explicitly cancelled the effects of the
Spanish Constitution in the Catalan territory. Working on the assumption that the
Catalan people is sovereign, the Catalan legislature enacted a statute (Law 19/2017)
that established the rules for holding a referendum on independence. Importantly,
the statute provided that if more votes were cast in favor of independence
than against it, the automatic legal consequence would be the declaration of
independence of Catalonia. The other statute (Law 20/2017) regulated all the issues
that would arise if Catalonia declared its independence from Spain, regarding
nationality, the status of civil servants working for the Spanish institutions, taxes,
international relations, and a host of other matters. 
The Spanish Constitutional Court, at the request of the Spanish government,
ordered the Catalan authorities to stop the implementation of those statutes. The
judicial orders were patently disregarded, however, and the referendum was held
on October 1. The “Yes” vote won (89%), though only 43% of citizens participated,
so the Catalan parliament formally declared independence on October 27, after
some weeks of hesitation. As a response, the Spanish government used article 155
of the Spanish Constitution, which empowers it to adopt extraordinary measures
to neutralize decisions by regional governments that breach constitutional and
legal norms or gravely imperil the general interest of Spain. The authorization of
the Senate is needed for these purposes. On the basis of article 155, the Spanish
government dissolved the Catalan parliament and called early elections in Catalonia.
The members of the regional cabinet were removed. In those elections, the
secessionist parties did not get the majority of the popular vote, but they obtained a
majority of the legislative seats, so they managed to install a president that insists
on breaking away from Spain. The extraordinary measures taken by the Spanish
government were lifted once the new Catalan government was formed. Uncertainty
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remains concerning the future steps the secessionist leaders will take. One of the
catchphrases they are currently using is “We’ll do it again”. Whether this is mere
rhetoric or something more serious, only time will tell.
So I side with Martí when he characterizes the events just described as a coup
d’état, even if it is different from the traditional military coup. The next question, then,
is whether the actions perpetrated by the leaders of the secessionist movement
can be understood to be crimes under Spanish law, and whether the Spanish
Constitution or international law protects those actions in the name of fundamental
rights, including the right to protest. The Spanish Supreme Court deals with these
issues in its lengthy opinion. Martí contends that the Court goes wrong in several
places. 
Formal aspects
Martí makes a preliminary point that goes to the formal aspects of the Court’s
opinion. He asserts that it is “telling” that the Court “spends less than 40 pages
describing the proven facts of the case, and only 10 pages to justify the charge
of sedition, while it spends 193 pages, 40% of the whole text, arguing that no
fundamental right of the defendants had been violated during the process”. He
contends that the Court has issued a “defensive ruling”, as if judges were concerned
about appeals to the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. 
First of all, it is not accurate to say that only 40 pages are devoted to describing the
proven facts. In addition to those 40 pages, the Court spends 180 pages to describe
the actions performed by each of the accused persons, and to justify its findings of
fact in light of the evidence produced at the trial. 
More importantly, I don’t understand why the Court should be criticized for taking
seriously all the arguments based on fundamental rights made by the lawyers in
defense of the secessionist leaders. Instead of focusing on the Criminal Code
exclusively, the Supreme Court takes into account the Spanish Constitution and
the relevant international legal instruments to make sure that no fundamental rights
are breached. Since counsel made a large number of claims based on fundamental
rights, we would expect the Supreme Court to fully reason its answer. If the Court
had been brief in this part of its opinion, we would rightly criticize it for its lack of
constitutional sensitivity. Actually, what impresses me most when I read this section
of the Court’s opinion is how carefully it deals with the arguments proffered by
counsel, some of which were really very implausible, such as the argument that says
that the actions in question were shielded against the operation of the Criminal Code
because international law empowers Catalonia to unilaterally secede from Spain, or
that no crime was committed because the leaders were exercising their “right to civil
disobedience”. The Court does not quickly dismiss such claims, but it instead works
out a rather pedagogical and detailed answer to them. 
I find it laudable, for example, that the first issue the Court tackles concerns the
use of the Catalan language by the persons accused at trial. The Court devotes
13 pages to exploring the relevant domestic and international sources of law on
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this matter, and to explicating the reasons justifying the position it had taken at
the beginning of the trial. The Court had allowed the accused persons to speak in
Catalan, if they so wished, and had made two translators available to them who
would translate their utterances after they were made, so that everybody present at
trial or watching it through the public media would be able to follow. The secessionist
leaders finally chose to speak in Spanish, but they were given that option.
Rebellion and sedition
Let us now turn to the content of the Court’s opinion regarding the crimes the leaders
were charged with. Martí has no objection to the Court’s findings that there was
disobedience of judicial orders, as well as misappropriation of public funds. 
Martí agrees with the Court that the actions cannot be classified as “rebellion. Martí
argues that article 472 of the Criminal Code requires violence of a very specific kind,
a form of violence that is conducive to the breach of the constitutional order. “And”,
he adds, “everyone knows – in Spain and worldwide – that the Catalan secessionist
movement has been, until now, essentially peaceful and civic”. 
I think there is some confusion here. Yes, the movement has been “essentially”
peaceful and civil (until now), but this does not exclude that a number of violent
actions were performed by some people as part of the secessionist strategy.
Evidence of such actions was brought to the trial, and the Court found the evidence
compelling. What drove the Court to finally reject the crime of rebellion was its
judgment that those acts were clearly insufficient to achieve secession effectively.
The Court further noted that, as a matter of fact, the leaders deceived the masses:
while they explicitly said they were struggling for Catalan independence by way of
the referendum and the laws they passed, in reality they merely wanted to bring
pressure on the Spanish government to force it to negotiate the independence of
Catalonia. One may agree or disagree with the Court’s holding on this point, which
some commentators find a bit contradictory, but it is important for the record to note
that the Court found that forms of violence had been engaged in, though not of the
relevant kind for purposes of the crime of rebellion.
The Court deemed the actions in question to count instead as “sedition”, as defined
by article 544 of the Criminal Code. Martí provides us with an English translation of
the conduct described in this provision, but the translation is incomplete. Martí writes
that the article punishes “a public and tumultuous uprising with the aim of unlawfully
preventing the enforcement of the law, or the functioning of any public authority, or
the enforcement of any administrative or judicial decision”. But Martí silences that
the article explicitly says “by force or through illegal means” (“por la fuerza o fuera de
las vías legales”). This is important, since some of Martí’s objections make no sense
in light of the actual text. He argues that we should interpret the article to require
some element of violence and some significant harm. Given that the article says “by
force or through illegal means”, I need to hear more from Martí as to why we should
read the article to require some element of violence. The particle “or” conveys a clear
message that violence is not required.
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As to harm, Martí makes a rather astonishing assertion at this juncture. He writes:
“To be fair, the only real harm that was produced in those weeks of September and
October of 2017, as everyone knows, was the harm of the police officers beating
with their sticks hundreds of voters in the referendum trying to scare them and
prevent them from voting”. To be clear, I was appalled by the images of police
brutality on October 1, and I hope that the courts that are handling these cases
currently under investigation will impose the pertinent legal sanctions to the officers
who acted that way. But this does not detract from the fact that “real harm”, of
significant quality, was caused by the secessionist leaders as well. As already noted,
Martí has repeatedly written in previous posts that those leaders perpetrated a coup
d’etat from a constitutional perspective. I would think that such an action causes
harm. Can a coup d’état be harmless? 
Furthermore, as already observed, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence
shows that violence was resorted to by secessionists, even if it was not of the
serious kind that the crime of rebellion requires. So I am surprised that Martí
maintains that “everyone knows” that the only harm was caused by the police. Martí
should not take for granted that “everyone knows” this, when this is actually denied
by many, including the Supreme Court after assessing the evidence.
Martí also argues that, “since there is such controversy about the correct
interpretation of the crime of sedition”, the Supreme Court should have picked up
“the most restrictive interpretation of the crime”, which would have led to an acquittal.
I don’t have enough space here to explain why I don’t think this is the way we should
solve interpretive problems when applying a criminal code. But even if the Court had
espoused a very narrow interpretation, under which some “element of violence and
significant harm” must have been caused, as Martí suggests against the letter of the
article, I still don’t see how the secessionist leaders should have been acquitted, in
light of what the Court has found as to the facts.
The right to protest
Martí’s main claim, however, appears in the last section of his post, where he
invokes the democratic rights of protest (freedom of expression, freedom of
assembly, and the right to participate in demonstrations) to challenge the Court’s
decision. According to Martí, there is an opposition between the crime of sedition
and the democratic right to protest, so that an extensive interpretation of the crime
leads to an unconstitutional restriction of the right.
Martí mentions some past instances where protesters who had caused public
disorders were not charged with the crime of sedition. He correctly says that the
Supreme Court has introduced by way of interpretation certain elements of the crime
so that only certain kinds of actions will be regarded as seditious, while others will
be taken to amount to lesser crimes, or no crimes at all. As Martí summarizes the
Court’s holding, for an uprising to be seditious it must be (a) massive or crowded,
(b) generalized in the territory, and (c) strategically planned. This holding permits
the Court to implicitly distinguish this case from earlier instances of protest that
had occurred in Spain. Note that the Court is actually narrowing down the scope
- 4 -
of the crime, not expanding it. We may agree or disagree as to whether the Court
has successfully distinguished the different cases. I don’t have a strong opinion on
this, but I do think it makes sense to draw lines depending on the extent to which
the constitutional order is endangered by the relevant conduct. It is one thing for
protestors to prevent an eviction judgment to be enforced by the police, or to make it
impossible for some political representatives to enter parliament, or to occupy public
squares illegally. It is quite another, I submit, to hinder the task of public authorities
through a set of actions that are part of a systematic plan to achieve Catalonia’s
independence through a coup d’état. You might say this is a question of degree, but
questions of degree often matter in the eyes of the law. It is worthy of note, by the
way, that citizens who protested in September and October, and those who voted in
the referendum, have not be tried, nor will they be.           
Martí relies heavily on the right to protest, and criticizes the Supreme Court for
treating it as an “exotic right”. The Court, of course, recognizes the constitutional
protection of the right to protest, but insists that it cannot be transformed into an
“exotic right to physically prevent the police officers from enforcing the law or a
judicial decision, and to do it in a generalized manner in the whole territory of
the regional Autonomous Community”. I concur with Martí’s claim that we should
be careful when defining the limits of the right to protest, and that an expansive
interpretation of the Criminal Code may lead to the infringement of the right. But
I suggest we should avoid a simplistic understanding of the problem. Take the
case of protesters that physically prevent members of parliament from entering
the assembly to do their tasks as representatives. This is not simply a conflict
between the fundamental right of protesters, on the one hand, and public interests,
on the other. Fundamental rights appear on both pans of the scale. Citizens have a
fundamental right to protest, sure, but they also have an equally basic right to elect
their representatives, and the latter have a basic right to carry out the functions for
which they have been elected. There is a clash of rights, at least apparently, and
we need to harmonize them. It would be naive (and I am sure Martí will agree) to
suggest we should never criminalize any form of protest at all, in order to secure
fundamental rights. Non-criminalization produces costs, also in terms of protection of
fundamental rights.
In a more philosophical vein, Martí refers to the work of Philip Pettit to emphasize the
centrality of the right to protest in a scheme of contestatory democracy. I think this
reference is illuminating for our discussion, though I have reservations about Martí’s
claim that, when discussing questions of political legitimacy, “everything starts with
the most basic right to protest and contest the decisions made by your authorities”.
I am uneasy with the notion that “everything starts with” a particular value. I am
inclined to a more coherentist and holistic approach when thinking about the grounds
and conditions for the construction of a legitimate political order. 
More importantly, if we think about freedom of speech in light of a republican
conception of liberty, it is critical to take into account the material conditions that
affect people’s choices. You may be formally free to speak your mind, but you
may face circumstances of subordination that make it materially unlikely you
will speak up. I say this because Martí’s argument on the chilling effect that the
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Supreme Court’s decision may generate when it comes to exercising one’s right
to protest should be placed in a wider context. I side with Martí when he urges us
to be careful about the contours of the crime of sedition and other crimes that may
be applicable when citizens protest. But let us look at the broader picture from a
republican perspective, to get the priorities right. Regarding protest and speech, the
most serious problem in Catalonia is not that secessionists (or other movements
in the future) may abstain from performing legitimate acts of protest for fear of the
criminalizing consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision under examination.
The gravest concern relates to the difficulty many people in Catalonia face when
trying to express their rejection of secessionist ideas. Yes, those citizens are
formally recognized the right to speak. As a matter of fact, however, secessionism
is the hegemonic ideology held by the structures of power at the regional level in
Catalonia, and it penetrates many institutional and social spheres, including public
schools. The problem is especially serious in the interior parts of Catalonia, where
the secessionist discourse in official and public domains is just overwhelming. Since
I know Martí is sensitive to this concern, given his republican conception of liberty, I
would have appreciated some mention of this issue.       
A final note
I’d like to end my comment on Martí’s thought-provoking piece with this note: I fully
support his conclusion that the Catalan conflict “is not fixed by this decision”. I have
met no one who thinks that fixing the problem was the Court’s call, however. It is for
political actors to work out a solution to bring things back to constitutional normalcy,
and to discuss legal and political changes to better accommodate the aspirations
of a majority of Catalan citizens. If pardoning the secessionist leaders is part of the
solution, politicians should take the appropriate steps and bear responsibility for
their decisions. But we cannot require a court of justice to balance all these political
considerations when adjudicating a case. The harshness of the sentences that have
been imposed, moreover, will probably be softened in practice soon, through the
application of the penitentiary regime, administered by the Catalan authorities, which
allows for permissions to be granted to prisoners to serve part of their sentences
out of prison (the so-called “semi-open regime”). Meanwhile, it will be interesting to
see what the Spanish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights
have to say with respect to the fundamental rights at stake. I am sure Martí will write
an illuminating post on those decisions when they are handed down in the future,
thus enriching our legal and philosophical discussions.                                                
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